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Designated Diffidence: District Court Judges
on the Courts of Appeals

James J. Brudney

Corey Ditslear

Since 1980, District CourtJudges, designated pursuant to federal statute, have
helped decide over 75,000 court of appeals cases-nearly one of every five merits decisions. Although scholars and judges have warned that the presence of
these visitors on appellate panels may undermine consistency, legitimacy, or
collegiality, little empirical evidence exists related to such concerns. Working
with an especially complete data set of labor law opinions, the authors found
that district court visitors perform in a much more diffident fashion than their
appellate colleagues. They contribute notably fewer majority opinions and dissents. In addition, their participations do not reflect their professional or personal backgrounds to nearly the same degree as their appellate colleagues do
when voting on labor law matters. The authors' findings and analyses regarding
the behavior of designated district judges should be of interest to appellate
courts considering the challenges of caseload management and to scholars
studying processes and outcomes in the courts of appeal.

Introduction

the past two decades, district court judges-desigOver
nated pursuant to federal statute (28 U.S.C. § 292 [1994])-have
participated in nearly one out of every five cases decided on the
merits by the United States Courts of Appeals. The circuits invite
such participation principally because there are not nearly
enough active and senior appellate judges to meet the demands
of a burgeoning appeals court docket (Baker 1994, McKenna
1993). Responding to this imperative, designated trial court visiWe thank Lawrence Baum, Douglas Berman, Victor Brudney, Deborah Merritt,
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tors have helped decide more than 75,000 court of appeals cases
since 1980.
Scholars in law and political science have on occasion questioned the role played by these judicial invitees. Some have contended that the pre-judicial backgrounds and trial-oriented experiences of district judges differ in material respects from those
of "regular" appellate judges (Saphire & Solimine 1995; Slotnick
1983; Carrington 1969). Others have worried that district judge
visitors may jeopardize the consistency-of-law values that inform
the circuit courts' role in creating and clarifying legal precedent,
or that participation by these same judges may compromise the
collegiality and vitality of appellate court deliberations (Green &
Atkins 1978; Saphire & Solimine 1995; Wasby 1981). It also has
been suggested that district judge participation may undermine
perceptions of legitimacy, as the appellate courts' presumptively
neutral function of declaring the law shades into more prescriptive policymaking (Alexander 1965; Green & Atkins 1978; Note
1963).
Surprisingly, little empirical analysis exists regarding how
these trial court visitors behave in their secondary appellate role.
There is a dearth of information as to whether designated judges
participate or vote distinctively from their appellate brethren on
substantive law matters. It also is unclear whether district judges
bring their individual values and experiences to bear on the judicial enterprise to the same extent as their panel colleagues, or
whether they reflect those values and experiences in the same
way as they do when serving on the trial bench.
This study provides insights into the role of district court
judges in appellate decisionmaking. We examine district judge
participations in more than 1,100 published and unpublished
court of appeals cases reviewing decisions by one federal
agency-the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)-during a
recent seven-year period. Our database encompasses all appellate
cases decided between October 1986 and November 1993 that
resolve unfair labor practice claims under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA [1994]).' We have identified the 223 appellate judges and 105 district judges who participated on the court
of appeals panels, and how they voted on more than 2,000 substantive labor law issues as to which appellate courts either affirmed or reversed the Board. For each of the 328 participating
judges, we also coded the nature of judicial participation on
every issue (e.g., authoring majority opinion, joining majority,
authoring dissent), as well as a range of biographical factors that
1 The NLRA, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) is codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). Our database derives from one analyzed in previous articles by
one of the authors (Brudney et al. 1999; Brudney'1996). The 1999 article includes a
detailed discussion both of how the database was constructed and of the variables it contains.

HeinOnline -- 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 566 2001

Brudney & Ditslear

567

reflect personal attributes, educational preparation, and pre-judicial political and professional experience.
Our results indicate that designated district court judges
keep a low public profile, writing fewer signed majority opinions
and dissents than their appellate peers. They also do not vote in a
substantively identifiable way on labor law issues; we found that
district judge status was not significant in predicting votes for or
against the union's legal position. Nor do these designated visitors reflect their personal or professional backgrounds to the
same degree as their appellate colleagues do when it comes to
voting on labor law matters, or as they themselves seem to do
when serving on the trial bench.
Given their relatively muted participation on appellate court
panels, district judges' presence would seem to pose little threat
to the values associated with consistency-of-law or to the perceived legitimacy of judicial outcomes. At the same time, the apparently self-effacing nature of such participation does raise concerns regarding district judges' contributions to collegiality and
robust deliberation on appellate courts. Our results and analyses
therefore carry both encouraging and cautionary messages that
should be of interest to appellate courts considering the challenges of caseload management and to scholars studying
processes and outcomes in the courts of appeals.
In Part I of this article, we set forth our premise that individual values and experiences matter to good appellate judging.
Social scientists have long asserted empirically the importance of
individual values in the judicial process, but it is worth highlighting how policymakers, leaders of the bar, and judges themselves
have come to acknowledge their normative importance as well.
Part I also examines the justifications for using designated districtjudges on court of appeals panels and discusses the concerns
expressed by scholars regarding their use.
Part II describes the database used in our study, including
how we coded issues and judges. We rely on an unusually diverse
set of background and control variables, and then apply logistic
regression, supplemented by predicted probability calculations,
for variables that achieve significance. These methods enable us
to compare in depth the effects of various personal and professional experiences for district judge visitors as distinct from regular appellate court judges.
Part III presents our findings.-The district judges in our data
set differed in numerous intriguing respects from their appellate
colleagues. For instance, district judges participating on appellate courts in our 1986 to 1993 time frame were significantly
more likely to be older and to have been appointed by Democratic presidents, yet significantly less likely to be Catholic or Jewish or to have graduated from an elite law school. We also found,
as noted above, that district judges seldom author opinions, and
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that their votes for or against the union's legal position are associated with far fewer personal or professional background factors
than are the votes of regular appellate judges.
In the final part of the article we discuss our findings, relating them to prior concerns regarding designated judges and considering some limitations on our results. Elaborating upon our
findings regarding the modesty of district judge invitees, we consider whether our NLRA data set-encompassing review of decisions by a federal agency in a specialized area of substantive
law-might not be representative of the entire appellate court
docket. We also recognize that our results may overlook other
contributions to the appellate process made by these visitors. At
the same time, we suggest reasons for thinking that district
judges' conduct here may not be atypical of their broader performance on appellate courts, while identifying possible areas for
further study that might help address the matter of typicality.
I. Courts of Appeals and Their Designated Guests
A. Individual Values and Appellate Court Judging
The United States Courts of Appeals have been aptly referred
to as the "vital center" of our pyramidal federal judicial structure.
(Lumbard 1968). Acting through three-judge panels to resolve
over 20,000 cases each year, 2 the circuit courts alter or sustain
rulings made by trial judges or regulatory agencies and in the
process establish consistent legal norms covering a geographic
region. Moreover, by providing the final word on important matters of public law, largely immune from the Supreme Court's exercise of discretionary jurisdiction, 3 the courts of appeals play a
distinctive policymaking role as well.
Divergent views exist regarding the extent to which appellate
judges engage in routine error correction, as distinct from somewhat discretionary law declaration or more expansive policymaking, when fulfilling their responsibilities under Article III of the
2 See Annual Reports: Table B-i (1990 through 2000). In addition to cases resolved
on the merits following oral argument or submission of briefs, the courts of appeals dispose of thousands of cases on a prepanel basis, through procedural terminations such as
dismissals, settlements, or transfers to another circuit, and also through consolidations.
3 The Supreme Court in the 1920s reviewed 10% of all circuit court decisions; the
review rate since the mid-1980s has been less than one half of one percent (Baker 1993,
19; Songer 1991, 47). The Supreme Court in its 1999-2000 term decided 74 cases by
opinion after argument; 62 of these opinions reviewed circuit court decisions as opposed
to state court or federal district court judgments. Assuming arguendo that the Supreme

Court develops its annual docket from 12 months' worth of appellate court dispositions,
one can conclude that the Court reviewed 0.2% of the 27,516 merits decisions by circuit
courts in 2000. Even in subject matter areas that trigger the Court's more frequent exer-

cise of its certiorari jurisdiction, such as civil rights, appellate court decisions are left undisturbed more than 98% of the time (Songer 1991).
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Constitution. 4 Notwithstanding the debate as to how these complementary functions are apportioned, there is now broad underlying agreement that each judge's "personal makeup" influences
her decisionmaking on all three fronts (Baum 1997; Cardozo
1921; Edwards 1983). In sifting through the competing parties'
often plausible arguments based on plain meaning, doctrine,
and precedent, judges inevitably draw upon their individual experiences and attitudes as part of their effort to render a just
result under the law.
Certain judges expressed at an early point their understanding of the role played by "the complex of instincts and emotions
and habits and convictions, which make the man" (Cardozo
1921, 167; also Frank 1932). More recently, among 35 appellate
court judges from three circuits who were interviewed on background between 1969 and 1971, almost all acknowledged that
they considered their personal views of justice important in deciding cases even when there was clear, relevant precedent (Howard 1981). If the legal rules were uncertain, itself a matter involving varied individual perceptions, these judges ranked their
personal views of justice as "very important," according them
slightly more weight than the closest applicable circuit court ruling (Howard 1981, 164-65).
Since the early 1980s, appellate judges have become more
open in stating their views that individual values are, and ought
to be, part of their decisionmaking enterprise. Written decisions
based on analysis of language and precedent and the application
of settled interpretive rules are essential if the judiciary is to
maintain its legitimacy (Abrahamson 1993; Coffin 1980). In
varied settings, however, these judges also recognize that their
individual perceptions of justice and fairness, and the background experiences that helped shape such perceptions, will inform their own reasoning as well as the dynamic of deliberation
among colleagues.
Some judges advocate resorting to personal beliefs and value
judgments to help them decide hard cases in which the legal
arguments are inconclusive, although they may disagree as to
how often such legal indeterminacy occurs (Edwards 1983; Kaye
1988). Others refer to a specific role for the value of compassion
in good judging-whether through expansive construction of a
compassionate statute (Schroeder 1990) or compassionate consideration of individual cases (Reinhardt 1999; Posner 1995; also
4 Compare, e.g., Clark & Trubek (1961, 256), reportingJudge Clark's estimate that
for 300 appeals that he reviewed on the Second Circuit over a two-year period, "clear oneway cases comprised at least 70%, while around 10% were highly original cases giving
scope to the method of social values [and i]n the remaining 20%, the outcome actually
proved certain, but counsel might be forgiven for thinking they had a bare chance of
success" with Posner (1986, 190-91), maintaining that in appellate litigation, unclear
cases-with textual uncertainty and credible contextual arguments for both sides-outnumber the clear cases.
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Cross 1997). Judges have candidly acknowledged that their personal backgrounds and experiences influence how they decide
cases (Reinhardt 1999; Wald 1984) and that they are, on occasion, affected by the experiences of their colleagues in the course
of group decisionmaking (O'Connor 1992). Indeed, they have
pointed to how this very diversity of intellectual capital, born in
part of divergent personal experiences and value preferences,
creates a "balance of eccentricities" that helps generate more reliable legal standards (Abrahamson 1993, 985, quoting Cardozo
1921).
The belief expressed by so many appellate judges that individual human values are an integral part of resolving cases (Kaye
1988) is further reflected in the widespread support for increased diversity on the federal bench. Political leaders and key
members of the bar have cited the inclusion of more female and
minority judges on federal courts as improving both the reality
and the public perception of our judicial system. 5 Their position
rests on the notion that judges who bring contrasting personal
backgrounds and experiences to the federal bench will express
those diverse perspectives as part of the intense collegial interchange that ultimately produces a stronger and more
6
respected set of legal standards.
Finally, quite apart from the normative dialogue as to
whether individual values should influence appellate court judging, a number of social scientists studying judicial behavior have
long maintained that, as a practical matter, individual values do
make a difference in the judicial process. Specifically, they contend that pre-court life experiences play a prominent role in
5 See Clinton (1999), highlighting the diversity of his appointments to the federal
bench; Shepard (1992), reporting President Bush's and candidate Clinton's urging to
pursue and appoint qualified women and minority candidates to the federal bench; Bush-

nell (1995), discussing the American Bar Association's recent passage of a resolution encouraging the appointment of people of color to the judiciary, and reporting the National Bar Association president's statement that "[a] more diverse judiciary will minimize

prejudice and insensitivity fromjudges, and engender more respect from the public." See
also Schafran (1991), reporting justice Brennan's statement that "there should be diversity in many respects" on the Court, including geography, politics, race, gender, and religion, and adding that "[t]hese are all segments of our pluralistic society and I think people
are a little more comfortable when they see a broadly representative group. It is more
than a symbol. People bring different experiences and insights to their work."
6 See "Report" of the Working Committees of the Second Circuit Task Force (1997,

180-81), concluding that greater diversity on the federal bench enables judges to amplify
areas of rational disagreement when applying legal rules; enhances the understanding of
all judges about subtle influences of race, ethnicity, or gender; and enriches the judicial
conversation by adding less familiar points of view; and Beiner (1999), contending that

diversity increases the prospect that judges will be able to see and assess the differing
perspectives of the many parties to federal litigation. See also Working Committees (1997,
179-80) "Report," contending that minority or female litigants, jurors, and attorneys will
have greater confidence in the legal system if the bench is more diverse; and Ninth Circuit Gender Bias Task Force (1994, 784),'reporting that 58% of female judges and 65% of
female lawyers surveyed believe the male-dominated bench in the Ninth Circuit favored
male practitioners, whereas 9% of male judges and 14% of male attorneys shared that
belief.
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shaping the personal values and policy preferences of judges,
and that such biographical factors can be useful in predicting
judicial decisions (Aliotta 1988; Baum 1997; Glick 1993; Tate
1981). While the evidence from empirical analyses of appellate
court judges is decidedly mixed, many studies indicate that a
judge's political party affiliation provides a strong link to judicial
voting behavior in discrete subject matter areas (Brudney et al.
1999; Carp et al. 1993; Goldman 1975; Gryski & Main 1986;
Nagel 1961; Songer & Davis 1990). Other background characteristics, including gender, age, experience in elected office, and
status of college or law school attended, also have been shown to
make a difference in some studies. (Brace & Hall 1990; Brudney
Davis et al. 1993; Goldman 1975; Nagel
et al. 1999; Crowe 1997;
7
1974; Ulmer 1970).
Notwithstanding the individual values and personal background that each judge brings to the decisional process, there is
no suggestion-from the bench, the bar, or the academy-that
judges are or ought to be platonic guardians proclaiming their
ideal versions of the law. Whether one characterizes them as driving forces or broad constraints, statutory language, Supreme
Court precedent, and the law of the circuit impose meaningful
limits on judicial behavior. Still, reliance on individual values is
an important component of appellate judging, and we have
made it part of our baseline for assessing how designated district
judges perform their functions on the appellate bench.
B. The Practical Role of Designated District Judges

District judges have been regular contributors to appellate
court panel decisionmaking since before 1980. As indicated in
Table 1, they participated in more than 25% of cases decided on
the merits by three-judge panels from 1980 to 1986. Their relative level of participation declined to 17% for the period of our
study, a decline that may be related to a noticeable rise in the
availability of appellate judges during the mid and late 1980s. 8
7 With respect to attributes and experiences other than political party affiliation,
there also are numerous studies finding no significant relation to voting patterns by federal judges (Brudney et al. [1999, 1685, n.29; 1751, n.234; 1754, n.240]).
8 See Annual Reports (1980-2000). As Table 1 indicates, district judges' absolute
level of participation has remained relatively steady for two decades, while the overall
appellate court caseload has virtually doubled. The sharp decline in district judge participation rates between the 1980 to 1986 period and the 1987 to 1993 period was accompanied by a 17% increase in the number of active and senior appellate judges between 1984
and 1991 (from 195 to 228), see "Judges of the Federal Courts" section of West's Federal
Reporter, 710 F.2d vii-xxviii (1984), 914 F.2d vii-xxx (1991). Perhaps related to this increase, a number of circuits that had relied more heavily on district judge participations
in the early 1980s (DC, 2d, 3d, 7th, 9th) cut back substantially by the late 1980s and early
1990s. See Annual Reports (1980-1991), Tables B-1, S-I (en banc cases excluded), and V-2.
There may be a slight overstatement as to the percentage of cases with district judge
participation, because a very small number of cases include two district judges on a single
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District judges' level of participation has averaged nearly 15%
since the end of 1993.
Table 1. District Judge Participations in Court of Appeals Panel Cases

Year
1980-86
1987-93
1994-00

District Judge
Participations
in Panel Decisions
Cases with District
Total
Avg. Per Yr. Judge Participations (%)

All Merits Cases
Decided By Panels
Total
Avg. Per Yr.
96,462
149,423
186,668

13,780
21,346
26,536

24,982
25,470
27,833

3,569
3,639
3,976

25.9
17.0
14.9

There has been considerable variation among circuits with
regard to reliance on district judges, as illustrated in Table 2.
During the seven-year period from which our database is drawn,
the Sixth and Tenth Circuits made use of these visitors in more
than 30% of panel decisions. By contrast, the D.C. Circuit and
Fifth Circuit utilized district judge visitors in fewer than 5% of
merits cases.
Table 2. Circuit Variations in Use of District Judges, 1987-93
Circuit
D.C.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Panel Merits Decisions
5,460
5,087
9,434
10,792
14,008
18,622
16,154
9,246
11,506
23,336
10,107
15,691

Decisions with DJs

(%)

3.8
13.8
19.9
20.0
22.6
4.4
33.0
13.1
16.3
13.2
31.2
11.8

The relevant statutory language authorizes district judge service on a court of appeals "whenever the business of that court so
requires."9 This spare text' includes no standards for determining when such service is appropriate or how district judges
are to be selected. One can find occasional references to the
selection process in local circuit rules 10 or informal circuit
panel. Four cases out of the 307 decisions in our district judge data set included participation by two district judges.
The 25.9% participation rate for the years 1980-86 appears to represent a slight increase from the 1970s. Although data were not kept as systematically prior to 1975, district
judges participated in 23% of the merits cases decided by appellate court panels both in
1975 (2,070 participations; 9,077 cases) and in 1977 (2,602 participations; 11,400 cases).
9 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (authorizing chief judge of a circuit to designate or assign a
district judge within that circuit). Subsection (d) authorizes temporary designation or
assignment of a district judge from another circuit "upon presentation of a certificate of
necessity by the chiefjudge ...of the circuit wherein the need arises."
10 See, e.g., Ninth Circuit Rules, Introduction, E.5, observing that court policy is for
district judges not to participate in disposition of appeals from their own districts.
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guidelines,"' but the circuits have not adopted written policies
governing the selection of individual judges or their overall frequency of use.
We conducted a series of telephone interviews with Circuit
Executives from all courts of appeals in late 1999, early 2000, and
mid 2001, in an effort to identify the courts' principal reasons for
relying on district judges. 12 Not surprisingly, the primary reported rationale is efficiency: District judges are asked to serve
when there are not enough appellate judges to fill all panels due
to vacancies, emergencies, or the sheer volume of cases. In that
context, most Circuit Executives identified a range of workloadrelated selection criteria, such as favoring experienced or senior
district judges, judges whose trial dockets left them enough time
to serve, and judges who previously had completed their work
promptly when serving on the appellate court. Some circuits invoke the supplemental rationale of orientation to the circuit, asking new district judges to serve once within six months to a year
13
of their appointment.
With regard to advance planning, the circuits designate district judges for scheduled panel sittings many months before
cases are briefed or argued. The actual cases are assigned to
these long-constituted panels anywhere from four to twelve weeks
in advance of argument. Cases are assigned to three-judge panels
on a random basis, although a judge may be excluded from a
certain case due to conflict of interest. One such conflict identified by Circuit Executives is that a district judge will not be assigned to review a case from his or her own district.
C. Concerns about the Use of Designated District Judges
Scholars in law and political science have expressed reservations about the role of district judges on appellate court panels.
Available evidence suggests that, in recent decades, appellate
judges come to the bench from more prestigious backgrounds
than their district court colleagues. They are more likely to have
attended Ivy League colleges and law schools, to have served as
11 See, e.g., Sixth Circuit Memorandum entitled "Panel Composition and Assignment of Cases" at 2, observing that chief judge's selection of district judges is based inter
alia on prior performance in sitting with the appellate court and also current workload
burdens as a trial judge (copy on file with authors).
12 Susanna Marlowe, Research Librarian at The Ohio State University College of
Law, conducted telephone interviews with Circuit Executives (or, in two cases, Assistant
Circuit Executives) and Calendaring Clerks for all 11 regional circuits and the D.C. Circuit in November 1999, January 2000, and June 2001. She was repeatedly advised that
there was no written policy governing the designation process. Notes of these conversations are on file with the authors.
13 Professors Sapphire and Solimine (1995) gathered similar information by using a
formal questionnaire in 1993. The responses .they received were comparable to ours,
identifying the dual objectives of meeting workload concerns and educating/orienting
new judges, though with perhaps less emphasis on the former.
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law clerks, to have had a federally oriented law practice, and to
have been elevated to the bench from a law school professorship
(Goldman et al. 2001; Goldman & Slotnick 1999; Goldman 1991,
1997; Slotnick 1983). Recognizing, or perhaps anticipating, these
differences in education and training, the ABA Standing Committee on the Federal Judiciary has distinguished between trial
and appellate court nominees in its evaluation criteria, stating
that appellate judges "should possess an especially high degree of
scholarship and academic talent and an unusual degree of overall excellence [including t]he abilities to write lucidly and persuasively, to harmonize a body of law, and to give guidance to the
trial courts for future cases" (American Bar Assn. 1991, 3-4; also
American Judicature Society 1988, 612). Such differences in
intellectual background and expected performance have led
some to suggest that designated district judges may not be well
suited to resolving appellate-level cases that often carry broad
and nuanced public policy implications (Saphire & Solimine
1995; Slotnick 1983).
A related issue is whether participation by district judge visitors on appellate court panels undermines consistency of doctrine within a circuit. An early study based on judicial interviews
reported that a minority of Ninth Circuit judges felt their district
court fellow panel members contributed substantially to intracircuit inconsistency (Wasby 1981). There is modest subsequent evidence indicating that district judge participation in a panel decision may make it somewhat more likely the decision will be
granted en banc review.1 4 If such an effect exists, it may reflect
litigating attorneys' belief that district court visitors tend to depart from the circuit's prevailing legal standards. Alternatively,
perhaps some appellate judges are more prone to view district
judge participation as compromising the perceived legitimacy of
close or controversial panel decisions.
A somewhat different type of concern is the belief that substantial district judge participation weakens collegiality on the
14 See Sapphire & Solimine (1995, 372-75), reporting on an unpublished 1979
study involving 297 split decisions in which the district judge or the senior or visiting
circuit judge wrote the majority opinion, and an unpublished review of 224 en banc decisions published in the years 1985-87. Two earlier articles asserting a link between district
judge panel participation and en bane reversal similarly address the combined effect of
visiting or senior circuit judges as well as district judges; in addition, they are based on a
very small number of cases from a single circuit. See Alexander (1965, 596), discussing 32
panel decisions reviewed en bane by the Second Circuit between 1956 and 1964, 18 of
which involved participation by a district judge or a senior or visiting circuit judge; Note
(1963, 879), discussing seven en bane reversals by the Second Circuit between 1956 and
1963, and reporting that six of the panels involved a visiting or senior circuit judge and
one included a district judge.
Unlike designated district court judges, senior or visiting circuit judges do not differ
in intellectual background or general judicial experience from their appellate court colleagues, and senior judges are not even outsiders to the culture of the circuit they are
serving. Accordingly, the prior studies that grouped all three types of judges together for
analytic purposes are somewhat suspect.'
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courts of appeals. While the crux of the unease over consistency
is that district judges may be too active or independent, the essence of the collegiality issue is that district judges may not be
independent enough (Green & Atkins 1978; Saphire & Solimine
1995). Frequency and intensity of communication among judges
is part of a collegial working relationship within a circuit (Seitz
1991). It may be that the press of their trial court workload, combined with the reality of their subordinate status, makes district
judges unduly willing to defer to their circuit court colleagues,
thereby helping to undermine the vitality of panel deliberations.
In short, concerns over judicial collegiality as well as doctrinal
consistency have been raised when district judge visitors serve on
appellate court panels.15
Each of these matters merits closer attention. Empirical study
can help address contentions that designated district judges are
at once quicker than their appellate colleagues to depart from
doctrinal norms and more submissive when those norms are being debated. Analysis of our data set yields important insights on
these matters.
IH.The Database
The courts of appeals adjudicated 1,224 decisions involving
unfair labor practice (ULP) claims under the NLRA between
October 28, 1986, and November 2, 1993.16 We obtained a complete list from the Appellate Division in the National Labor Relations Board's Office of General Counsel. Almost one-quarter of
the appellate decisions (22.9%)reversed, remanded, or modified
a Board order; we coded all 280 of these "reversals" using a detailed issue coding approach. Of the remaining 944 cases that
wholly enforced or affirmed a Board order, we analyzed a random sample of 275 decisions stratified by year. We then weighted
these sampled affirmances to reflect their presence in the full
population.
15 In an e-mail letter to one of the authors, Judge Harry Edwards of the D.C. Circuit
indicated that "ensuring (1) timely opinions, (2) consistency in the law of the circuit, and
(3) improved collegiality among the members of the court" contributed to his court's
decision in 1991 to stop using visiting judges either from the D.C. District Court or from
other circuits. Judge Edwards noted that visitors were sometimes uncomfortable with the
size and complexity of administrative law cases that are a staple of the D.C. Circuit. In
addition, the fact that the Circuit encompasses only the District of Columbia itself meant
that district judges sitting by designation had to review cases decided by their colleagues
on the trial court, something they were often reluctant to do. See e-mail from Hon. H. T.
Edwards toJ. Brudney, Oct. 17, 2000, on file with the authors.

16 Those cases include three major categories of claims: allegations that an employer engaged in an unfair labor practice (ULP) under section 8(a); charges that a
union committed a ULP under section 8(b); and disputes under section 10(c) regarding
the nature and scope of relief against employers found liable for section 8(a) violations.
For further discussion of these categories, see Brudney et al. (1999).

HeinOnline -- 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 575 2001

576

Designated Diffidence

The 1,224 decisions we analyzed include nearly 2,200 issues
on which the appellate courts either affirmed or reversed results
reached by the Board.' 7 Because each appellate court decision
reflects results rendered by a three-judge panel, our data set includes more than 6,500 judicial participations on NLRA issues.
Each judicial participation consists of one judge's vote on a specific issue in a case appealed from the Board.
We omitted from our analyses about 450 judicial participations because they involved procedural, jurisdictional, or constitutional matters that differed substantially from the core doctrinal issues we analyze here. We also omitted votes from three
summarily affirmed cases for which we could not identify the participating judges. With these omissions, our database consists of
6,034 votes on unfair labor practice claims arising under the
NLRA. District judges cast 571 of these votes, roughly 9% of the
total. 18
The dependent variable for most of the analyses in this article is whether ajudge voted to support the union's legal position
on a specific issue in a given case. 19 We employ logistic regression
models to analyze the dichotomous nature of this dependent variable (Aldrich & Nelson 1984; Greene 1997).20 In addition, we
present the predicted probabilities of the vote for the union
21
based on changes in the values of the independent variables.
For our initial analysis, examining types of judicial participation by each judge on each issue, we employed a different depen17 A single case often involves two or more issues; for instance, the appellate court
may review two different Board findings of employer misconduct, or an employer may
appeal both a finding of liability and the remedy prescribed by the Board. Unanimous
decisions result in coding all three panel judges identically on the issue(s). When individual judges dissent, their statement of reasons identifies the issue(s) on which they disagree with the majority. The ULP issue codes are set forth, and the coding process is
described in greater detail, in Brudney et al. (1999) and Brudney (1996).
18 Districtjudges participated in 307 of the 1,140 cases (26.9%) that involved ULP
claims during this period. This case participation rate is three times their issue participation rate because district judges almost always are paired with two appellate judges on a
panel; thus their votes on issues reflect one-third of their presence in cases.
19 Our study addresses associations between various judicial background variables
and the union's legal position. Often, the union's legal position will have been endorsed
by the Labor Board in the decision being reviewed by the appellate court. We could have
focused on judicial disagreement with the Board (rather than the union) as our dependent variable. We chose not to do so because we were more interested in the substantive
and historical tensions between courts and unions than the formal administrative law
exchanges between courts and government agencies. See Brudney et al. (1999). Still, in
order to take account of correlations between pro-union and pro-Board outcomes, we
added a control variable addressing the Board's result for each issue. See n.29.
20 In all but one of our analyses, we examine judicial attributes that may impact the
probability that ajudge will vote for or against the union position. We use STATA version
six software for all our multivariate analyses.
21 Unlike coefficients in ordinary least squares regression, where a coefficient represents a change in Y as a result of a one-unit change in X, coefficients in logistic regression
do not lend themselves to easy interpretation. To facilitate understanding of the impact
of the different variables, presentation of predicted probabilities is helpful. Predicted
probabilities represent the likelihood of a pro-union vote given a certain set of values for
the independent variables (Long 1997).
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dent variable that is broken down into four categories: authoring
an opinion, authoring a separate concurrence, authoring a separate dissent, or joining the opinion of another judge. We compare each of the first three categories against the reference category of joining another judge's opinion.
For the rest of our analyses, we coded more than a dozen
independent variables for each decided issue, reflecting demographic, educational, and professional characteristics of each
judge. The first variable indicates whether each judge was appointed by a Republican or Democratic president. We coded
four basic demographic attributes: the judge's age at the time of
decision; the judge's gender, as well as an interaction effects variable for being a female Democrat; 2 2 the judge's religion, comparing Catholic and Jewish judges together to the predominant category of Protestant judges; 23 and the judge's race, comparing first
African American and then Asian and Latino judges to the reference category of White judges. 24 Two variables designate each
judge's educational background. The first reports the prestige of
the judge's undergraduate institution, which has been shown to
be a proxy for socioeconomic status (Brudney et al. 1999) The
second indicates whether the judge graduated from one of 15
25
elite law schools.
We also included eight variables reporting each judge's lawrelated work experiences before appointment to the court of appeals. These include elected and nonelective political experience, as well as prior judicial experience and prior experience as
a law professor. They also include four variables identifying distinct varieties of corporate, labor, and workplace law experience.
One variable denotes judges who represented corporations or
business clients but did not have experience on any workplacerelated matters. A second designates judges who had experience
22 With respect to appellate court judges, we had previously discovered that female
judges tend to favor unions more often than their male colleagues do and that Democratic appointees tend to register pro-union votes more often than do their Republican
counterparts. While the difference between Republican women and Republican men was
substantial on this score, Democratic women and Democratic men did not differ signifi-

cantly in their propensity to support the union. We included a female/Democrat interaction term here as well, allowing us to assess the relationship between gender and political
party. See Brudney et al. (1999).

23 Earlier analyses of appellate court judges showed that Catholic and Jewish judges
voted similarly (and differently from Protestant judges) once we controlled for other vari-

ables. See Brudney et al. (1999). Grouping the Catholic and Jewish religions also reflects
their relative outsider position compared to the majoritarian status of Protestants.
24 Prior analyses of appellate court judges showed that Asian and Latino judges in
this population voted in similar patterns, and that these patterns differed significantly
from both African American and White judges (Brudney et al. 1999).
25 The 15 schools are Harvard, Yale, Berkeley, Chicago, Columbia, Cornell, Duke,
Michigan, NYU, Northwestern, Pennsylvania, Stanford, Texas, UCLA, and Virginia (The
Cartter Report 1977; Brudney et al. 1999).
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representing management clients in NLRA cases. 2 6 The third
marks judges who had experience under the NLRA that involved
no representation of management, i.e., they were labor law academics or they represented unions or the government on NLRA
matters. 2 7 Our last workplace law variable designates judges who
had experience on workplace-related matters other than those
28
arising under the NLRA.
Finally, we included a variable denoting the status of being a
designated district judge. While our rich array of judicial background variables will illuminate differences between district and
appellate judges in how they resolve NLRA issues, the basic district judge variable indicates whether this status predicts union
support or opposition when controlling for our background factors.
We also included a series of control variables that signal the
doctrinal and litigation context in which a case is adjudicated, as
distinct from the individual background and experiences that a
judge brings to the case. These include controls for the Board
outcome (for or against the union) regarding each issue raised
on appeal, 29 for claims arising under five separate provisions of
the NLRA, for the circuit in which the case was decided, 30 and
for the year in which each vote was rendered. These control variables enable us to assess potential biases for or against the union
in varying doctrinal settings, in different circuits, and across time.
We modified some independent variables to test specific hypotheses. Nonetheless, our basic analyses adhere to the coding
scheme outlined above.
All of our findings address only unfair labor practice claims
under the NLRA; different relationships might emerge if one ex26 Judges in this category included both those whose exclusive NLRA experience
was on behalf of management and those whose experience included union, government,
or academic work as well as management representation.
27 We excluded from this category judges who combined union, government, or
academic experience involving the NLRA with management experience under that statute. Judges with such mixed experience were grouped with purely management attorneys
in our previous variable.
28 We actually constructed two versions of this final variable. First, we linked the
variable to both of our "NLRA experience" variables; it therefore included judges with
experience on other workplace matters (such as employment discrimination, pensions, or
safety and health) but no NLRA experience of any kind. Next, we contrasted the variable
only with our "NLRA management experience" variable; accordingly, it included the
judges from our first version and also judges with NLRA experience that never involved
representing management. In our analyses of appellate court judges, we had relied principally on this second version, though we also reported some results under the first (Brudney et al. 1999). For ease of comparison we discuss both versions here as well.
29 This variable enabled us to control for deference to the administrative agency,
which is one of the most important doctrinal influences on a judge's vote. See, generally
Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
30 The circuit variables controlled for possible differences in the types of controversies arising in each circuit; the overall ideology of the court on which each judge served;

and the possibility that forum-shopping might affect the caseload reaching each circuit
(Brudney et al. 1999).
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amined other fields of law. Yet there are advantages to exploring
a discrete area of substantive law, especially one featuring decisions that are numerous and (in relative terms) doctrinally coherent. Our study identifies the role played by district judges undisturbed by the possible conflating effects of other federal law
matters. Moreover, as we discuss in Part IV, our findings are unlikely to apply only in the NLRA area.

IH. Results
A. Comparing District Judges and Appelate Judges: Attributes
and Experiences
Our full database consists of 5,463 NLRA issue-specific votes
by appellate judges and 571 such votes by district judges. Table 3
reports the separate means for appellate and districtjudges, both
for our dependent variable (a vote for the union) and for all
independent and control variables in this universe. As the table
reflects, appellate and district judges favored the union at virtually identical rates (76% v. 77%). With regard to judicial characteristics, however, district judges differed from their appellate
colleagues in a number of intriguing respects.
District judges serving as appellate court visitors were significandy more likely to have been appointed by Democratic presidents who held office prior to Presidents Reagan and Bush.
These district judges also were significantly more likely to have
been appointed earlier and to be older than their appellate
judge colleagues. On average, district judges were appointed
four years earlier, and were five years older, than their fellow
panel members at the time they decided issues. District judges
also had more "pure" experience representing only government
or only unions in NLRA matters before joining the bench.
On the other hand, district judges were significantly less
likely than their appellate colleagues to be female, African American, or Catholic or Jewish. They also were less likely to have
graduated from an elite law school, though they were about as
likely to have attended a prestigious undergraduate institution.
Finally, district judges were significantly less likely to have had
any type of nonelective political experience, to have held prior
judicial office, or to have represented management at all in
NLRA matters.
In terms of our control variables, a comparison reveals that
circuit-by-circuit reliance on district judges for NLRA decisions is
broadly consistent with the appellate courts' use of district judges
in all contexts. The D.C., Fifth, and Ninth Circuits had significantly fewer instances of district judge participation than would
be predicted based on their share of NLRA issues, while: the
Fourth and Tenth Circuits had significantly more participations
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Table 3. Means for All Variables: Comparing Appellate Judges
and District Judges
Appellate Court
N = 5,463

Variable

District Court
N= 571

Vote for Union
Judicial Characteristics
*Democratic appointee
*Year appointed
*Age
*Female
*Female/Dem. interaction
*African American
Latino or Asian
*Catholic or Jewish
College selectivity
*Elite law school
Elected office
*Nonelective position
*Prior judicial experience
Legal academic exp.
Workplace law exp.
Corporate law exp.
*NLRA mgmt. exp. (any)
NLRA mgmt/bd interact.
Pure mgmt. exp.
*Pure union exp.
*Pure govt. exp.

0.76

0.77

0.34
80.01
60.25
0.11
0.07
0.06
0.02
0.47
61.35
0.57
0.22
0.73
0.57
0.27
0.28
0.47
0.14
0.12
0.11
0.05
0.01

0.43
76.37
65.35
0.02
0.004
0.02
0.01
0.38
61.92
0.47
0.17
0.66
0.41
0.27
0.34
0.43
0.08
0.08
0.08
0.10
0.03

Control Variables
Board for union
Section 8(a)(1) and (3)
Section 8(a) (5)
Other section 8(a)
Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
*D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
*Fourth Circuit
*Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
*Ninth Circuit
*Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Year of decision

0.88
0.45
0.34
0.02
0.08
0.11
0.14
0.01
0.09
0.10
0.06
0.05
0.19
0.10
0.06
0.12
0.03
0.04
89.83

0.91
0.44
0.38
0.02
0.06
0.10
0.03
0.01
0.09
0.08
0.20
0.02
0.24
0.09
0.09
0.07
0.07
0.02
90.04

* Indicates difference of means between appellate and district judges is significant at
<0.05, for continuous variables, and difference of proportions is significant at 50.05 for
dichotomous variables.

by districtjudges. Our earlier presentation of overall circuit variations (Table 2) indicated that the D.C. and Fifth Circuits made
almost no use of district judge visitors during this seven-year period, and the Ninth Circuit was similarly a low-use circuit. By contrast, the Fourth and Tenth Circuits were among the three appel-
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late courts relying most heavily on district judges to address their
general caseload between 1987 and 1993.31
B. District Judges' Low Profile Role in Writing Opinions
and in General Voting Patterns
1.

In assessing the role played by district judges as members of
an appellate panel, we first examined differences in types ofjudicial participation between district and appellate judges. For these
analyses only, we employ a multinomial logistic regression model
to account for the four types of participations engaged in by appellate and district judges. When compared to the baseline category of joining a decision, district judge visitors are significantly
less likely to author signed majority opinions, or to dissent from
majority opinions, than are their appellate colleagues.3 2 An appellate judge has a 12% probability of authoring a majority opinion. For a district judge this probability drops to 8%, a substantively significant difference.3 3 Although the low number of
dissenting participations warrants a cautious approach, the
probability that a panel member will write a dissent similarly
declines from 0.9% to 0.3% when we compare appellate and
district judges, again a substantively significant difference.3 4 District judges tend not to be outspoken or to assume leadership
roles when it comes to the form of their panel participation. Although the difference in predicted probabilities forjoining in an
opinion is not substantively significant, it is noteworthy that 87%
of all district judge participations in our data set involved the
judge joining another panel member's opinion, as compared
with 81% of appellate judge participations.
31 The Sixth Circuit, which used district judges most often during this period (33%
of all its panel decisions on the merits), also made liberal use of these visitors to decide
NLRA issues: approximately one-fourth of all district judge participations on NLRA matters occurred on Sixth Circuit panels.
32 District judges are not more or less likely to write concurrences than their appellate colleagues. However, there are so few concurrences in NLRA cases at the appellate
court level, and even fewer with district judge participations, that results regarding concurrences must be interpreted with caution. Results for all these multinomial regressions
are on file with the authors.
33 When we talk about substantive significance based on predicted probabilities, we
are referring to the relationship of the 95% confidence ranges around the predictions for
the profile judge (appellate judge) and the judge with the altered characteristic (district
judge). Where the ranges indicate that the judge with the altered characteristic is predicted to be less likely to write an opinion than the profile judge, we can say that the
difference is substantively significant. The range for an appellate judge to write an opinion is 8% to 18%, whereas the range for a district judge is 4% to 11%.
34 The range for an appellate judge to dissent from an opinion is 0.2% to 3%,
whereas the range for a district judge is 0% to 0.85%. Because there are only 89 total
dissenting participations in the entire data set, one must exercise caution when interpreting these results.
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The reduced likelihood that district judges will author opinions might be related to panel dynamics involving the presence
of these designated outsiders. If mixed panels, comprised of two
appellate judges plus a district judge invitee, are for some reason
more inclined to reach unanimity and also are more likely to
agree upon issuing unsigned per curiam decisions, then the overall disparity in opinion-writing between appellate judges and district judges could be due to the behavior of different types of
panels rather than to the reticence of district judges. In order to
test this possibility, we compared mixed panels and "pure" appellate judge panels with regard to opinion-writing. We found, however, that the mixed panels were significantly more likely to issue
signed majority opinions than panels without a district judge
member, even as district judges were significantly less likely to
author those majority opinions than their two appellate panel
colleagues. Panels that included district judges also were more
likely to dissent than pure appellate judge panels (though this
finding only approached significance), yet. district judges on
those mixed panels were significantly less likely to author a dis35
sent themselves.
The greater propensity of mixed panels to issue majority
opinions might reflect an inclination by the two appellate judge
panel members to claim "credit" for handling a disproportionate
share of the more serious opinion-writing work. In addition,
some of the cases assigned to district judge visitors as majority
opinions might have been issued as per curiam opinions if decided by a pure appellate judge panel. This could occur because
presiding panel judges may wish to accord respect, and participatory credit, to their district judge guests without imposing
the full responsibility of authoring majority opinions in more
complex or controversial cases. Either of these two explanations,
or their combined effects, could account for the tendency of
mixed panels to author more majority opinions.
The higher likelihood that such mixed panels will produce a
dissent could relate to the absence of a third "coequal" member
engaged in the same long-term relationships. The collegial giveand-take of pure appellate judge discussions may help panel
members work through their potential areas of disagreement, or
agree to let minor differences go unremarked. Further, as part of
the subtle interactive process among three repeat players, appellate judges may occasionally agree that if an opinion remains unpublished they will forgo their inclination to dissent. 36 In the
35 For majority opinions, mixed panels were more likely to have a signed majority
opinion (coeff. = 0.626; p = 0.000), while district judge members of those panels were less
likely to author such opinions (coeff. = -0.912, p = 0.000). For dissents, mixed panels were
more likely to dissent (coeff. = 0.720; p = 0.085), while district judge members were less
likely to be the authors of said dissents (coeff. = -1.913, p = 0.005).
36 Judge Wald, a former member and chief judge of the D.C. Circuit, refers to having observed "wily would-be dissenters go along with a result they do not like as long as it
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end, however, regardless of what might account for the stronger
opinion-writing tendencies of these mixed panels, district judges'
rereticence in authoring both majority and dissenting opinions 37
mains noteworthy in comparison with their panel colleagues.
Another possible factor that could help explain district judge
diffidence in opinion-writing involves the prospect that district
judges-seeking promotion to the court of appeals wish to avoid a
"paper trail," lest they provide ammunition for critics or opponents during a future confirmation process (Cohen 1991; Sisk et
al. 1998) In that regard, we identified five district judges who
served on appellate panels as part of our data set and who subsequently have been elevated to the appellate bench. These five
reviewed a total of 25 NLRA issues, for which they did not author
a single signed majority or dissent.3 8 For several reasons, however, we are reluctant to attribute particular meaning to their
silence. The five judges involved here served on the district court
for between five and seventeen years before being "promoted,."
and almost every appellate court decision in which they participated as visitors preceded their elevation by a period of from two
to six years. It seems unlikely that these men and women would
have developed a long-range plan to maintain strategic opinionwriting silence as invitees in order to enhance their prospects for
a permanent seat at the appellate table. Assuming arguendo that
district judges may at times consider the possible career-related
implications of their conduct on the bench, 3 9 such consideration
seems especially unlikely to influence the decision whether to author an opinion on this class of low-visibility NLRA cases that generally involve routine review of agency decisionmaking. Further,
is not elevated to a precedent" (1995, 1374). Although Judge Wald adds that such strategic behavior is not a regular occurrence, even occasional instances may contribute to the
disparity in dissent-writing between pure and mixed panels.
37 A number of judicial scholars have reported that since the 1970s, most circuits
have adopted various forms of case management techniques, including the use of staff
attorneys to conduct pre-panel screenings and to draft proposed short form opinions in
certain "routine" cases that are then issued as unsigned per curiam decisions (Meador &
Bernstein 1994; Robel 1990; Stienstra & Cecil 1989). Because cases are assigned to panels
on a random basis, however, there is no reason to believe that the presence of a district
judge guest on such panels should be associated with a higher number of short form
opinions drafted by staff attorneys.
38 The actual decisions we coded included three per curiam affirmances; two unanimous affirmances and one unanimous reversal with signed opinions; and one per curiam
affirmance with a signed dissent. One affirmed case involved two distinct issues; all other
cases addressed only one issue. We factored in the weighted value of the six affirmances.
39 For discussion of the complexities of using "promotion potential" as a variable,
see Cohen 1991, 188-89; Sisk et al. 1998, 1487-93. Both Cohen and Sisk utilized a promotion potential variable when analyzing the likelihood that district judges, acting authoritatively in their trial court roles, would uphold the politically popular sentencing guidelines
as constitutional. They found the variable significant and positively correlated with a ruling in favor of constitutionality. By contrast, we analyze here the conduct of district judges
who are acting as one-third of an appellate court panel in reviewing a politically unimportant set of cases. Given this low-profile setting, a district judge contemplating future promotion might well opt for anonymity, rather than a signed opinion that could attract
attention.
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given the very small number of Board issues reviewed by these
district judges, who comprise less than 5% of the district judges
in our data set, one must be cautious in interpreting the results.
Even when these five identified judges are removed from our
analysis, district judge visitors remain significantly less likely than
their appellate colleagues to author majority opinions or dissents.
Finally, as we have adverted to previously, one might ask
whether district judges' modest role as authors of majority decisions reflects their own choices or those of the presiding panel
judges who assign opinions. Almost all NLRA appellate court
cases involve direct appeals from final agency determinations,
and district judges have relatively little exposure to federal labor
relations doctrine while serving on the trial bench. 40 Perhaps
presiding judges choose not to burden district court visitors with
the task of drafting majority opinions in an unfamiliar area of
law, particularly given that these visitors often are serving as a
favor to an overextended appellate court. On the other hand,
insofar as district judge participation reflects an effort to minimize workload demands for the circuit court, one might well expect district judges to be assigned their fair share of opinionwriting. Moreover, precisely because NLRA cases do not require
district judge visitors to review the work of their trial court colleagues, presiding judges may find it easier to assign them majority opinions in this area, especially in the cases deemed relatively
routine.
In order to determine whether district judges' comparatively
infrequent authorship of majority opinions is imposed from
above, one would need to conduct a particularized inquiry into
panel practices with regard to assigning opinions. The answer
may well vary among the 12 circuits, or even from one presiding
judge to another. On the surface, however, it does not seem unreasonable to believe that designated district judges are assigned
their fair share of NLRA opinions to write. If this is true, the
dearth of signed majority opinions suggests they are more willing
than their appellate colleagues to issue unsigned per curiam decisions. Further, even if it is the case that presiding appellate
judges are withholding opinion-writing responsibilities more
than districtjudges are declining to exercise such conferred powers, the result is that these visitors play a distinctly subordinate
role in authoring majority opinions. In addition, the significantly
smaller number of districtjudge dissents is necessarily a matter of
judicial choice, as these are written on a purely voluntary basis.
40 See 29 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1994), authorizing Labor Board to seek enforcement
of its orders in U.S. courts of appeals, and aggrieved persons to seek review of Board
orders in same courts. The NLRA provides for district courts to review substantive labor
relations matters in limited circumstances, particularly the rare occasions on which injunctive relief is sought. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(j), (1) (1994).

HeinOnline -- 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 584 2001

Brudney & Ditslear

585

2.
The pattern of district judges performing as followers receives further support when we examine the impact of being a
district judge on votes for or against the union's legal position
(Table 4).41 The status of district judge visitor is never close to
significant when added as a distinct independent variable to our
set of judicial characteristics. The lack of significance is evident
when we remove all private practice experience variables from
our equation. 4 2 The finding also obtains regardless of how we
adjust the equation to take account of judges' workplace exper43
iences.
The fact that district judges do not differ in their support for
the union's legal position when compared with appellate judges
is not surprising given the trends we identified with respect to
judicial participation. If district judges are authoring few majorities or dissents and are largely following the lead of appellate
judges on their panels, one might expect that their pattern of
votes for or against the union would not differ significantly from
that of appellate judges.
It is possible that district judges took a distinctive position
regarding unions that was not apparent when our analysis combined all their votes. One could, for instance, hypothesize that
district judges were less favorably disposed toward union legal positions. This proclivity might show up in the minority of instances
when district judges author an opinion, but that pattern could be
concealed by the overwhelming majority of instances (nearly
nine-tenths) in which they simply vote to join a panel opinion,
most of which affirm pro-union Board results. To test this hypothesis, we analyzed separately the effect of district judge status
when district judges wrote their own opinions and when they
joined the opinion of another judge. For each subset of partici41 In Tables 4-6, we follow the common social science convention of designating
results with a p-value of 0.05 or less as "significant" (Lee & Maykovich 1995, 281-82;
Moore 1997, 507). We designate results with a p-value of 0.10 or .less as "approaching
significance." Social scientists sometimes treat such results as identifying relationships that
are suggestive or at least that warrant further exploration (Moore 1997, 414-20; Sirkin
1995, 195-96). This is particularly true if the results form a consistent pattern with other
results that approach or achieve significance. To understand which of these statistically
significant variables are also substantively significant, we assess the predicted probabilities
for each variable that has a p-value of <0.10. See Table 7.
42 As explained in n.28, we classified workplace law experience in two different
ways. Regression analyses based on these two versions produced somewhat disparate results for district judges, which we discuss below. Because the two versions yielded some
differences in terms of which background variables were significant, we ran our regressions without private practice experience as well as including it.

43 Table 4 presents workplace law background separating judges with any NLRA
experience representing management from judges with all other types of NLRA-related
or non-NLRA workplace law experience. When we ran the equation coding separately for
judges with union, government, or academic experience under the NLRA, district judge
status still was not close to significant (coefficient = 0.016, p = 0.919).
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Table 4. Logistic Regression for Supporting the Union: District
and Appellate Judges Combined (N = 6,035)
Variable
Judicial Characteristics
District judge
Democratic appointee
Year appointed
Age
Female
Female/Democratic interaction
African American
Latino or Asian
Catholic or Jewish
College selectivity
Elite law school
Elected office
Nonelective position
Prior judicial experience
Legal academic experience
Workplace law experience
Corporate law experience
NLRA mgmt. experience (any)
NLRA mgmt./bd. interaction
Control Variables
Board for union
Section 8(a) (5)
Other section 8(a)
Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
Year of decision
Constant
2
Pseudo W

Omitting Private
Practice Experience

Including Private
Practice Experience

-0.017
0.579***
-0.009
-0.015*
0.718**
-0.918**
0.160
-0.919***
0.205*

0.006
0.607***
-0.013
-0.017**
0.727**
-0.870**
-0.026
-0.936***
0.189*
-0.020***
0.038
0.034
0.040
-0.048
0.060
-0.378**
-0.281*
0.585
-0.764**

-0.018"***

0.089
0.032
-0.034
-0.057
0.052

2.938***
-0.219**
-1.607***
-1.376***
-0.880***
-0.011
-0.423
0.570***
0.936***
0.307
-0.928**
0.214
0.024
0.789***
0.680**
0.201
-0.014
2.524
0.243***

***p <0.01, **p <0.05 *p < 0.10
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3.040***
-0.219**
-1.602***
-1.439***
-0.872***
0.066
-0.419
0.617***
0.947***
-0.383**
-0.911***
0.148
-0.036
0.751***
0.653**
0.142
-0.011
3.019
0.245***
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pations, district judge votes did not differ
significantly from the
44
votes of their fellow panel members.
C. The Role of Social Background Factors in District
Judge Performance
We turn next to a comparative analysis ofjudicial characteristics and control factors in order to assess more fully the performance of district judges. By separately analyzing district judge and
appellate judge behavior toward unions, we can determine
whether such background factors are as important in predicting
district judge votes on NLRA issues as they have been shown to
be for appellate judges. A negative answer would provide support
for the hypothesis that district judges sitting as circuit court visitors rely less than their appellate colleagues on the individual experiences and attitudes that have helped shape their personal
views ofjustice.
We begin with a regression equation (Table 5) that excludes
our three private practice variables; that equation reveals a sharp
difference between the predictive import of background factors
for appellate and district judges. When we add the three private
practice variables (Table 6), the contrast remains substantial, although several additional factors become significant for district
judges. By proceeding in this sequence, we demonstrate ex ante
how most of the attributes or experiences significantly associated
with districtjudge behavior toward unions achieve significance in
conjunction with the addition of the three private practice variables. As we suggest below, some of these changes can be explained based on strong correlations with certain types of prejudicial workplace law experience.

44 In order to test the hypothesis that district judges might be less favorable to the
union position when they write opinions than when theyjoin opinions, we split the model
including workplace experience variables from Table 4 into the instances of judges writing opinions and judges joining opinions. We then ran the regressions once again. The
district court variables were not significant in either regression model (p = 0.113 for written opinions and p = 0.119 forjoining an opinion). In each case the p-level is a considerable jump from what we found for the district judge variable in the full model (p = 0.887).
The signs of the coefficients help to explain this result. Whereas we hypothesized that
district judges might be less favorable to the union position when they write an opinion,
the coefficient indicates that they tend to be more favorable. Further, district judges tend
to be less favorable when they join an opinion. Upon reflection, one can see that these
results are consistent with the conception of districtjudges as followers. Districtjudges are
often given routine affirmances to write, which are heavily weighted in the union's favor,
resulting in the appearance of greater support for the union position. The subtraction of
these routine affirmances inevitably results in the appearance of less support for the
union in the remaining instances when district judges are joiners. In the end these results
must be regarded with caution because of the lack of statistical significance of the district
judge variable in either model.
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1.

Prior analyses of appellate judge participations from this data
set indicate that many different social background factors played
a role in judges' propensity to support or reject the union's legal
position. Appellate judges appointed by Democratic presidents
were significantly more likely to support the union, as were female judges appointed by Republicans and also judges who had
held elected office. Conversely, older judges, those who had
graduated from elite colleges, and more recent appointees from
45
both parties were significantly more likely to reject the union.
In explaining this wide array of significant associations between social background and judicial behavior, we suggested inter
alia that Democratic appointees traditionally favor employees' interests over employers, that older judges are generally more
likely to support conservative (pro-employer) outcomes, and that
attendance at an elite college is likely to reflect more privileged
socioeconomic status and consequently less familiarity with or
sympathy for the challenges faced by unions. (Brudney et al.
1999).
Judicial attributes and experiences, however, played virtually
no role in predicting the votes of district court visitors. Political
party, age, year of appointment, and college selectivity were not
significant; only prior elected office was significantly associated
with a district judge's propensity to support or oppose union
legal positions.
The contrast between appellate and district judges was
equally stark with respect to our control variables. Judges in both
groups were more likely to support the union when the Board
had reached the same result; this reflects the important role
played by agency deference. For appellate judges, however, the
mix of substantive issues and the differences in circuit culture
also were important in predicting judicial votes. Appellate judges
were less likely to favor the union when the parties presented
bargaining-related claims against the employer under section
8 (a) (5), or claims alleging union misconduct under section 8 (b),
than when the litigants sought review of issues arising under sections 8(a) (1) and (3), the provisions according basic protections
for union organizing activities (and our reference category).
Judges on the Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all were
45 See Brudney et al. (1999). As the data in Table 5 reflect, the coefficients for
Democratic party affiliation, age, and college status are strongly significant, while the coefficients for year appointed and elected office experience approach significance. The
analyses reflected in Table 5 included variables for the gender and race of each judge
(both African-American and Latino/Asian variables), and also a female/gender interaction term. We do not report results for gender or race because of perfect prediction
problems in the district court universe; there were not enough cases with a female or
minority district judge sitting by designation to produce reliable results. We also omitted
variables reflecting private practice experience; these are added to the equation in Table 6.
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Table 5. Logistic Regression for Supporting the Union: Appellate Judges
Versus District Judges, Private Practice Experience Omitted
Appellate
Judges
Judicial Characteristics
Democratic appointee
Year appointed
Age
Catholic or Jewish
College selectivity
Elite law school
Elected office
Nonelective position
Priorjudicial experience
Legal academic experience

Constant
Pseudo'R 2

District
Judges

Control Variables
Board for union
Section 8(a)(5)
Other section 8(a)
Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
4.059*
-3.449
Eleventh Circuit
0.247*** 0.306*** Year of decision

0.613*** -0.056
-0.020*
0.020
-0.022**
0.031
0.157
0.382
-0.020*** 0.002
0.042
0.304
0.208*
-1.486***
-0.148
0.669
-0.059
-0.080
0.071
0.062

Appellate
Judges

District
Judges

2.943***
-0.205*
-1.449***
-1.364***
-0.919***
0.055
-0.056
0.548**
0.874***
-0.468**
-0.976***
0.275
-0.064
0.838***
0.688**
0.079
-0.014

3.334***
-0.074
-2.238**
-1.673
-0.632
-1.084
##
-0.053
1.998
-0.053
-0.987
-0.328
0.556
0.470
1.020
#
-0.023

*p < 0.10
**p < 0.05
***p < 0.01

# Variable dropped because it perfectly predicts a pro-union outcome.
## Variable dropped because it perfectly predicts an anti-union outcome.

significantly more likely to support the union than were judges
on the Sixth Circuit (our reference category), while judges on
the Fourth and Fifth Circuits were more likely to vote against the
union.
Once again, district judges displayed little or no variation related to the mix of issues or the culture of particular appellate
courts. These visitors did not vote distinctly with respect to either
of the important substantive areas of law, 46 nor did their positions toward unions vary significantly among any of the circuits.
In sum, it would appear that district judges were considerably less
likely than their appellate colleagues to be affected by their experiences before joining the bench, by the types of legal issues
they faced, or by the circuit in which they sat.
Intriguingly, prior experience in elected office for appellate
judges was associated with votes favoring the union, but the same
variable was linked to votes opposing the union by district judges.
We examined the nature of the elected office experience acquired by the two groups in an effort to account for these divergent associations. Appellate judges who held elected office had
served in Congress, as big city mayors or city council members, or
on school boards, far more often than their district judge coun46 District judges, like their appellate colleagues, were less likely to support the
union when litigants presented claims under the miscellaneous § 8(a) category. These
claims were low in volume and importance when compared with claims arising under
§§ 8(a)(5) or 8(b).
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terparts. 47 These elected positions are more likely to demand
regular and constructive interaction with unions, and service in
them would tend to produce familiarity with and respect for the
role played by union representation. On the other hand, the majority of district judges who held prior elected office had served
as city or county attorneys or as rural state legislators. 48 These
were positions in which encounters with unions were likely to
have been less frequent, and we hypothesized that-especially at
the local prosecutorial level-they may well have involved adversarial and hostile exchanges.
We proceeded to test our hypotheses by replacing the elected
office variable with two separate variables-one for congressional, big city, and school board experience, and the second to
reflect local prosecuting attorney and rural legislative experience. For appellate judges, the signs of the two variables pointed
in the expected directions (pro-union for congressional and big
city, anti-union for local prosecutors), and the congressional and
big city variable was significant (p = 0.027) though the local prosecutor variable was not (p = 0.607). For district court judges, the
local prosecutor variable was in the expected anti-union direction and was also significant (p = 0.006), but the congressional
and big city variable was significant in an unexpected anti-union
direction (p = 0.014). The latter result, however, must be interpreted with caution. Nine of the 13 participations by district
judges with congressional, big city, or school board elected experience were by a single judge; this makes it more difficult to generalize about district judges who had such experience. In any
event, the distinctions drawn here demonstrate that elected office experience is not homogeneous. As a complex composite of
different political exposures, it may have diverse effects on judicial attitudes.
2.

When we added our three private practice experience variables to the comparative logistic regression equations, the results
were virtually unchanged for appellate judges with respect to the
prior variables (Table 6) .49 Looking at the new variables, we
47

Of the 1,183 judicial participations by appellate judges who had held elected

office, 22.7% were by judges elected to Congress, 11.5% by former big city mayors or city
council members, and 13% by former elected school board members. The corresponding
proportions for the 96 judicial participations by district judges who previously had been
elected to public office were 11.5% (Congress), 1% (big cities), and 1% (school boards).
48 District judges who served as elected city or county attorneys, or as representatives in a rural state legislature, contributed 56.2% of all participations by district judges
with elected office experience (28.1% each for city or county attorneys and rural state
legislators). For appellate judges, the comparable proportion was 30.5% (18% for local
attorneys, 12.5% for rural state legislators).
49 Year appointed moved from approaching significance to being significant for appellate court judges when the workplace experience variables are included. All statutory
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found that appellate judges with NLRA management experience
were more likely to support the union than50appellate judges who
lacked such management-side experience.
For districtjudges, the larger equation resulted in new significance for additional background factors. District judges who
were Democratic appointees, judges who graduated from an elite
law school, judges who had been law professors, and those with
nonelective political experience all were now more likely to favor
the union position. Conversely, judges in the D.C. Circuit and
Fifth Circuit were more likely to vote against the union, as were
judges who had workplace law experience 51other than management-side representation in NLRA matters.
Certain new results for district judges seem attributable to
the addition of the variable identifying judges who had any
NLRA management-side experience (as distinct from those who
lacked such experience but had worked on other workplace law
matters, or on NLRA matters without representing management). When we reconfigured the workplace law variables for
district judges to distinguish among different types of NLRA
practice (e.g., management-only, government-only, union-only),
Democratic appointment and law professor experience were 52no
longer factors associated with votes for or against the union.
and circuit control variables retained their significance levels (or lack thereof) with the
addition of the workplace experience variables.
50 This relationship applied only for cases in which the Board decision had favored
the employer's legal position. For discussion of why the impact of management-side
NLRA experience may signify that familiarity with the Act breeds greater respect for its
protective doctrinal scope, see Brudney et al. (1999, 1720, 1741-50).
51 At the same time, district judges reviewing miscellaneous section 8(a) issues no
longer show a significant tendency to oppose the union when we add the workplace experience variables. As indicated in Table 6, the coefficients for Democratic party status,
graduation from an elite law school, and service on the D.C. Circuit all approached significance; coefficients for the other four new factors were all significant.
We also ran analyses of district judges based on our alternative version of workplace
law variables (see n.28). The results are very similar to those in Table 6 with two exceptions: graduation from an elite law school became significant and party no longer even
approached significance. Two of the alternative workplace variables also are significant:
District judges with union or government experience on NLRA matters were more likely
to vote against the union. Given ease of comparison with previously published results for
appellate judges, as well as the modestly stronger explanatory power of the predicted
probabilities, we report in table form only the results for our equation using the NLRA
management-side experience variables.
At the bottom of Table 6, we note that we dropped one interaction term because it
was perfectly collinear with one of its component variables for district judge participation.
We did test all models that appear as tables for collinearity based on the Variance Inflation Factor, and we found that no other variables reached a critical factor as defined by
Fox (1991).
52 The data in Table 5 indicate that the party of the appointing president is significant for appellate judges (p _0.001), while for district judges the party variable does not
even approach significance (p = 0.896). When we add the workplace experience variables
in Table 6, the party variable does not change for appellate judges, but there is a very
large shift for district judges (p= 0.061). To try to understand this change we used our
more detailed analysis of workplace variables, broken into each specific type of NLRA
experience (union, government, and management). We found that by separating the
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Table 6. Logistic Regression for Supporting the Union: Appellate Judges
Versus District Judges, Private Practice Experience Included

Judicial Characteristics
Democratic appointee
Year appointed
Age
Catholic orJewish
College selectivity
Elite law school
Elected office
Nonelective position
Prior judicial experience
Legal academic experience
Workplace law experience
Corporate law experience
NLRA mgmt. experience
(any)
NLRA mgmt./bd. inter.

Appellate
Judges

District
Judges

0.631***
-0.023**
-0.024***
0.149
-0.022***
0.019
0.211*
-0.162
-0.046
0.061
-0.282
-0.285

0.841*
0.029
0.031
-0.019
-0.002
1.231*
-1.504***
1.289**
-0.442
1.243**
-2.723***
-0.667

0.640*
-0.896**

2.017
###

Control Variables
Board for union
Sec. 8(a)(5)
Other sec. 8(a)
Sec. 8(b)
Sec. 10(c)
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Seventh Circuit

Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
4.511*
-6.020
Eleventh Circuit
0.250*** 0.381*** Year of decision

Appellate
Judges

District
Judges

3.069***
-0.206*
-1.454***
-1.445***
-0.920***
0.113
-0.045
0.569**
0.894***
-0.534**
-0.993***
0.213

3.465***
-0.213
-1.854
-2.015
-0.850
-2.013*
##
-0.420
1.423
-0.901
3.085**
-0.117

-0.091
-0.607
0.792*** 0.421
0.670**
0.553
0.025
#
-0.012
0.006

Constant
Pseudo /e
*p !5 0.10
**p - 0.05
***p < 0.01
# Variable dropped because it perfectly predicts a pro-union outcome.
## Variable dropped because it perfectly predicts an anti-union outcome.
### Variable dropped because it was perfectly collinear with another variable in the model.

Nonelective political experience, elite law school background, and other workplace law experience remain positive and
workplace experience in this way, the party variable still did not change for appellate
judges, but it once again did not approach significance for district judges (p = 0.137).
The explanation for this vacillation regarding districtjudges appears to be related to
the strong correlation between district judges who were Democratic appointees and who
also had non-management-side NLRA experience. Every district judge with NLRA unionside experience and 75% of those with NLRA government experience were appointed by
Democrats, and each group was, surprisingly, strongly disposed against the union. By contrast, district judges with management-side NLRA experience were all Republican appointees; their coefficient indicates support for union positions, though it does not quite approach significance (p = 0.126). When private practice experience variables were omitted
entirely (Table 5), the strong anti-union associations of Democratic appointees with
union-side or government-related NLRA experience and the strong pro-union tendencies
of Republican appointees with management-side NLRA experience apparently acted in
combination to prevent the party variable from achieving significance. When we then
grouped these anti-union Democratic appointees in a workplace variable that included
district judges with state labor law experience or federal non-NLRA experience (where
party was an important predictor in the expected directions), their anti-union tendencies
were masked by the expected party-line voting of otherjudges, apparently resulting in the
increased significance of the party variable.
Whatever the explanation, it is noteworthy that the party variable remains strongly
significant for appellate judges under all three models. By contrast, the most that can be
said for district judges is that this same variable approaches significance in only one of the
three models. Further, the party variable turns out not to be substantively significant for
district judges when we assess predicted probabilities (Table 7).
Finally, the significance of legal academic experience may be an artifact of grouping
all legal academics with workplace experience into one variable in opposition to all legal
academics without such experience. When the workplace law variable is altered to separate out those with union and government experience, this relationship disappears.
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significant under either version of our NLRA practice variables.
We discuss possible reasons for some of these pro-union associations in Part IV below. Finally, for both the D.C. Circuit and the
Fifth Circuit, our findings are tempered by the fact that these two
appellate courts used the smallest number of district judges. The
significance results for such a limited number of district judge
participations (two cases in one circuit and four in the other)
should be regarded with caution.
To aid interpretation of the statistical findings, we conclude
our analyses by calculating the predicted probability for each
variable with a significant regression coefficient. 53 These predicted probabilities illustrate the extent to which each variable is
associated with a change in the likelihood that a judge will vote
in favor of the union. The predicted probabilities assume a baseline of a "profile judge" with the predominant (modal) characteristic for each bivariate variable and the mean value for each
continuous variable. Our profile district judge was inter alia appointed in 1976, was about 65 years old, attended a fairly selective college but a nonelite law school, had no NLRA or other
workplace law experience, and was sitting on the Sixth Circuit,
reviewing a section 8(a) (1) or (3) claim that the Board had decided in favor of the union. 54 Using the predicted probabilities,
we compare judges with other characteristics to our profile
judge.

55

For district judges, only three judicial attributes that were significant in Table 6 also make a substantial difference in predicting outcomes. As the predicted probabilities in Table 7 indicate,
the profile district judge has a 75% chance of voting for the
union. If the judge had attended an elite law school, the predicted probability of supporting the union would rise to 86%.
Conversely, if the profile judge had prior elected office experience, the predicted probability of favoring the union would drop
53 All predicted probabilities were run using the Clarify program with techniques as
explained in King et al. (2000).
54 Our profile appellate judge differed slightly from this district judge, in that inter
alia he was younger (age 60), appointed later (1980), and attended an elite law school.
55 We calculate the predicted probabilities by first using our regression equation to

compute the probability that a "profile judge" (one holding the modal value for bivariate
variables and the mean value for continuous variables) would vote in favor of the union.

We then calculate a series of values for Z and probability, changing a single characteristic
of the profile judge for each calculation. For example, we first change the value for Democratic appointment from its modal value (0 = Republican) to the nonmodal value (1 =
Democrat) while retaining the profile values for all other variables. For two continuous
variables (college selectivity and year of appointment), we altered the value from the
mean to the high. For the third continuous variable, age, we used a "high" of 76, which
was the oldest age of a judge fitting other aspects of the profile. We report these
probabilities in the predicted probabilities table, comparing them to the baseline
probability. The predicted probabilities we report show the first differences between the
prediction for the profile judge and the prediction based on the change in one of the
independent variables. These probabilities are calculated to indicate the 95% confidence
range for the prediction, allowing us to assess whether our prediction provides substantively useful information (Greene 1997; King 1998; King et al. 2000; Liao 1994).
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Table 7. Predicted Probability of Votes for the Union for Significant
Variables: District and Appellate Judges
District
Judge
Profile Judge
Judicial Characteristics:
Democratic appointee
Most recent year appointed
Older age (76)

Board against union
Section 8(a) (5)
Other section 8(a)

Section 8(b)
Section 10(c)
D.C. Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit

Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit

Appellate
Judge

Range+-

0.75

0.70-0.80

0.84

0.79-0.88

0.80
-

0.75-0.85

0.910
0.81

0.88-0.99
0.77-0.84

0.78"

0.73-0.82

0.810
0.87
-

0.78-0.82

-

-

Most selective college
Elite law school
Elected office
Nonelective position
Legal academic experience
Workplace law experience
Female
Latino or Asian

Range+

0.860
0.510
0.76
0.68
0.610
-

0.060
-

-0.71
0.60
-

0.61

-

0.81-0.90
0.41-0.61
0.69-0.81
0.61-0.75
0.54-0.68
-

0.00-0.19
-

0.57-0.80
0.33-0.80
-

0.26-0.85
-

-

-

0.84-0.90
-

0.920

0.87-0.97

0.640

0.48-0.77

0.20"

0.14-0.28

0.81
0.560

0.77-0.85
0.41-0.71

0.560
0.680
-

0.45-0.67
0.61-0.73

0.900
0.930

0.86-0.95
0.88-0.97

0.75
0.660
0.920
0.90

0.67-0.82
0.56-0.75
0.89-0.96
0.83-0.97

*

-

- Indicates the variable was not significant in earlier regression analyses; see Tables 4
and 6.
+ The Range is the 95% confidence interval for the prediction.
0 Indicates results for which the 95% confidence intervals for the predictions reasonably exclude the possibility that the profile judge's predictions are the same as the judge
with the altered characteristic. While the ranges do on occasion overlap, the actual prediction for the profile judge does not fall within the range for the prediction of the
altered characteristic. We can feel confident that the results are substantively significant
and trustworthy where the small degree of overlap between the two ranges would suggest
a true difference.

to 51%, and it dropped to 61% for judges who had workplace law
experience other than management-side NLRA representation.
With respect to other background factors, if the Board had voted
for the employer, the probability of this judge supporting the
union dropped dramatically-to just 6%. For the remaining five
variables that were significant in Table 6, the predicted probabilities do not provide enough confidence to conclude that district
judges with such attributes or experiences vote in ways meaningfully different from the profile judge. 56
By contrast, the predicted probabilities for appellate judges
indicate that many more of the statistically significant characteris56 Both party and legal academic experience are close to being substantively significant, but we still cannot reject the null hypothesis that these variables have no effect on
votes for the union. Nonelective office is not substantively significant, having only a potential 1% impact on votes for the union. And for the two circuit controls, the range of
the 95% confidence interval is so large that almost anything is possible, providing further
indication that we do not have enough cases to make a reliable prediction.
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tics from Tables 4 and 6 also are important in this substantive
setting. The data in Table 7 reveal that five separate judicial attributes that were significant in Tables 4 or 6 for appellate judges
make a meaningful difference in predicting outcomes. 57 The
profile appellate judge has an 84% chance of voting for the
union. Switching that profile judge from a Republican to a Democrat raises the predicted probability of union support to 91%.
Similarly, if the profile judge is female, the chance that she will
favor the union position rises to 92%. On the other hand, the
probability that the profile appellate judge will support the
union drops to 81% when the judge is older or when he attended
58
an elite college, and to 64% when the judge is Latino or Asian.
With respect to other judicial experiences, the differences
are even more notable. Appellate judges who served on the Second, Third, or Ninth Circuits have a substantially higher
probability of supporting the union than the profile judge from
the Sixth Circuit; for appellate judges from the Fourth or Fifth
Circuits there is considerably less chance of support for union
positions. If the profile judge considered a miscellaneous section
8(a) claim or a section 8(b) claim alleging union misconduct,
rather than the more prevalent section 8(a) (1) or (3) claim that
is the profile, the predicted probability of supporting the union
dropped to 56% in each instance. If the profile judge reviewed a
section 10(c) claim for relief, the probability of union support
declined to 68%. Finally, if the Board voted for the employer, the
probability of appellate judge support for the union plunged to
20%. Overall, from a substantive perspective, appellate judges'
decisions to vote for or against the union are associated with
more than three times as many background factors as the votes
59
of their district judge colleagues.
3.
There is one further set of observations to report before we
turn to a discussion of our findings. As we did with respect to
opinion-writing, we reran our analyses on background variables,
analyzing appellate judge votes on "pure" panels separately from
appellate participations on "mixed" panels. We found that the
significant background and control variables showed up strongly
for appellate judges participating on pure panels. Appellate
57

Female and Latino/Asian are included here even though they are not in Table 6;

they were significant for appellate judges in Table 4.
58 One should interpret results on Latino or Asian appellate judges with caution,
given the low number of their participations in the appellate judge database. Predicted
probabilities for two variables that were statistically significant for appellate judges in Table 6-year appointed and elected office experience-are not substantively significant
here.
59 For appellate judges, five attribute variables plus nine control variables are substantively significant under the predicted probabilities analysis; for district judges three
attribute variables plus one control variable are substantively significant.
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judges serving on mixed panels reflected some but not all of
these significant variables in their voting behavior. Notably, political party affiliation and many of the circuit control variables
dipped below established levels of significance for appellate
judges on mixed panels, although the coefficients still pointed in
60
the same directions.
These findings could be invoked to support the hypothesis
that appellate judges behave in a more circumspect fashion when
sitting with district judge "outsiders" than they do when reviewing cases with their regular appellate colleagues. Such a hypothesis would be consistent with contentions by some scholars ofjudicial politics that the presence of a judge who differs in an
important respect from other appellate panel members may exert a type of "whistleblower" effect, subtly influencing the behavior of his panel colleagues (Cross & Tiller 1998; Revesz 1997;
Tiller & Cross 1999). For several reasons, however, we believe it is
premature to reach such a conclusion here.
First, it is worth noting that the whistleblower effects argument is itself hotly contested, having been thoughtfully challenged by two federal appellate court judges (Edwards 1998,
Wald 1999). Second, an earlier article by one of the authors examining the same set of appellate judge participations on NLRA
matters found no whistleblower effects, though on a different issue (Merritt & Brudney 2001). In that article, the presence of a
"whistleblower"-i.e., a judge whose political, educational, or
professional experience differed from that of his two colleagues-was found not to affect the likelihood that a panel
opinion would be published. The fact that these same appellate
judges did not behave strategically, based on panel composition
with regard to decisions about whether to publish, counsels for a
cautious approach to inferring panel-related strategic behavior
here. Third, the likelihood of a whistleblower effect is very difficult to assess given the complex nature of panel dynamics when
so many different judicial background variables are being simultaneously analyzed. It is possible, for instance, that certain prejudicial experiences may operate at times to facilitate agreement
on pure appellate panels, rather than reinforcing more distinctive voting behaviors. An appellate judge initially inclined to support the union's legal position might change his mind after listening to and taking seriously the contrary views of his
60 For example, with respect to variables no longer significant for appellate judge
participations on mixed panels, Democratic appointees were still more inclined to support the union (coeff. = 0.673, p = 0.158), appointees from the Third and Ninth Circuits
were still more likely to support the union (3d Cir.: coeff. = 0.746, p = 0.232; 9th Cir.:
coeff. = 0.672, p = 0.212) and appointees from the Fourth and Fifth Circuits remained less
likely to support the union (4th Cir.: coeff. = -0.58, p = 0.169; 5th Cir.: coeff. = -0.897, p =
210). Elected office experience was the one background variable that changed coefficient
signs as well as losing significance for appellate judges on mixed panels (coeff. = -0.054,
p= 0.857).
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colleagues. This prospect may be enhanced, at least at the margins, by the presence of two fellow appellate judges with whom he
shares some presumptively pro-union background experience or
characteristic, such as Democratic political affiliation or graduation from a nonelite college.
Notwithstanding these and other uncertainties associated
with analyzing panel dynamics, it remains true that appellate
judges who participate together in reviewing Labor Board decisions reflect numerous background traits and experiences in
ways that district judge visitors do not. The fact that the same
appellate judges seem to reflect these traits and experiences less
distinctly when in the presence of a district judge co-panelist may
warrant further examination, but such additional inquiry is beyond the scope of this article.
IV. Discussion
Our examination of judicial behavior reviewing NLRB adjudications over a seven-year period reveals that designated district
judges differed in notable respects from regular appellate judges.
The fact that they were on average older and more senior than
their appellate colleagues may in part reflect the previously identified general propensity to invite senior districtjudges and those
with prior appellate court service when selecting judges to fill out
panels. That the judges who were chosen to serve often had attained senior status or accrued many years on the federal trial
bench may also help explain why during this particular period
(the years 1987 to 1993) they were more likely to be Democratic
appointees (i.e., appointed in the years 1961-68 or 1977-80) and
less likely to be female. 6 1 Further, the fact that our district judges
were less likely to have graduated from elite law schools, or to
have had management-side litigation experience with this federal
statute, comports with other studies reporting differences in education and training between district and appellate judges
(Goldman et al. 2001; Goldman & Slotnick 1999; Goldman 1991,
1997; Slotnick 1983).62
As panel participants, district judges were markedly less assertive than their appellate colleagues. They did not vote distinctively for or against unions when compared with appellate counterparts. They also were less likely to author signed majority
opinions or to issue dissents. As we noted earlier, this low-profile
approach to opinion-writing may be attributable in part to presiding panel judges' preferences not to overload invitees who are
61 Only eight females had ever been appointed to the federal bench at circuit or
district court levels before 1977 (Singer 1999).
62 On the other hand, previously identified differences between appellate and district judges in terms of college background and law professor experience are not manifested here.
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already performing a service simply by helping to decide cases. At
the same time, such preferences may be encouraged by the tendency of district court guests to be comfortable with the role of
filling out panel composition while not necessarily assuming coequal voice or responsibilities. The possibility of this latter tendency receives some support from our findings that district
judges' personal backgrounds and experiences are associated
with their voting stance toward unions markedly less often than
was the case for regular appellate judges.
Admittedly, district judges who graduated from elite law
schools were more likely to favor the union; that association is
consistent with perceptions of elite law school faculties-and
their graduates-as ideologically liberal and inclined to favor
government regulation (Posner 1993; Sisk et al. 1998; Williams
1996). In addition, district judges with'elected office experience
were more likely to reject the union. As discussed earlier, this
tendency may well reflect the rural and prosecutorial shading of
such experience, fostering a perception of unions as "foreign"
entities or even troublemakers warranting litigation challenges.
District judges with workplace law experience other than management representation in NLRA matters also were more likely
to vote against the union. Such experience generally involved
matters affecting individual employee rights outside the NLRA
ambit. Judges who typically litigated for or against the rights of
individual employees may perhaps have developed less sympathy
or appreciation for a federal statutory scheme premised on collective bargaining and other forms of group action rather than
individual rights (Brudney et al. 1999).
Even recognizing the role played by these three factors, however, 63 a more robust and varied range of background characteristics is associated with the votes of appellate judges for the same
NLRA issues. Fundamental life experiences or attributes such as
college background, political party affiliation, gender, age, and
race each played a distinctive role. 64 The culture of individual
63 Districtjudges with nonelective political experience were more likely to support
the union in the equation that included private practice variables (Table 6), though there
was no significant association when those variables were excluded (Table 4). Nonelective
experience is an unusually hybrid variable. The 65 district judges with such experience
had served in appointed positions at the local, state, or federal level, in executive or legislative capacities. In addition, many had acquired multiple experiences at different levels
or capacities. We have been unable to develop a satisfactory explanation for the prounion results associated with such experiences. In any event, the variable was not substantively significant under our predicted probability analyses (Table 7).
64 Some of these life experiences may not be constant across time; political party
affiliation is a classic example (Tate & Handberg 1991). In an earlier article, we found
that the political saliency of union issues among appellate judges is declining on a bipartisan basis (Brudney et al. 1999, 1737-39). Political party affiliation effects also may not be
constant across groups. Goldman's data indicate a somewhat higher level of prejudicial
party activism and congressional membership among appellate judges appointed over the
past four decades than among district judges appointed during the same period
(Goldman 1997, 349, 355). Nonetheless, it is notable that, as indicated in the text, district
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circuits and the mix of substantive labor law issues also were
65
meaningful in accounting for appellate judge voting patterns.
There is evidence to suggest that when districtjudges address
labor-related matters in their traditional trial court role they tend
to vote in a manner consistent with some of these formative experiences (Rowland & Carp 1996; Carp et al. 1993; Vines 1964).
While the findings regarding district court decisionmaking are
not uniform (Ashenfelter et al. 1995; Sisk et al. 1998), the presence of studies linking district court decisions in the workplace
law area to party affiliation and other background factors raises
the possibility that these judges may perform differently when
they sit on their own court rather than as visitors to an appellate
bench.
At one level, our results are reassuring. Designated district
judges play the part of dutiful followers on labor law matters.
They seldom author panel opinions, they even more rarely dissent, and they do not vote in any distinctively pro-union or antiunion fashion. Nor do their votes strongly reflect their partisan
affiliation. or personal life experiences, even though such background factors do appear to have some influence on appellate
judge approaches to NLRA issues. By providing a needed service
to circuit courts while they themselves remain in the background, these visitors can be viewed as promoting judicial efficiency without threatening the development of legal precedent
by their more experienced colleagues.
There are, however, some troubling implications to this picture ofjudicial performance. Appellate judges develop legal doctrine primarily through reasoned elaboration of language and
precedent, but those elements alone'are not sufficient. Appellate
courts have considerable discretion in deciding particular cases,
and the exercise of such discretion is, and ought to be, informed
by ajudge's individual experiences and beliefs as well as her legal
training and analytic skills. Given that human value judgments
play some role in appellate adjudication, an individual judge's
background and perspectives contribute in important respects to
her formation and exercise of independent thought during a
decisionmaking process that is meant to be intellectually vigorous as well as collegial.
Measured against this standard, the district judges in our data
set performed in a much more diffident fashion than their appellate colleagues. The scarcity of signed opinions suggests a willingness to assume or accept a relatively modest appellate role.
Moreover, in the aggregate, the individual characteristics and
judges' conduct as district judges addressing labor law matters seems more closely linked

to party affiliation than their performance as appellate court guests.
65 Five different circuits (2d, 3d, 4th, 5th, 9th) were statistically and substantively
significant, as were three different statutory subsections (miscellaneous § 8(a), § 8(b),
and also § 10(c)). -
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convictions of these visitors appear to figure less prominently
when deciding NLRA issues than was true for regular appellate
judges.
It is possible that designated districtjudges do not perform in
such reserved fashion when participating in other substantive law
areas. Perhaps their lack of'judicial experience on NLRB matters
engenders a lack of confidence regarding their sensitivity to the
current law of labor-management relations. This absence ofjudicial experience and familiarity on NLRA issues may lead presiding panel judges to assign them fewer majority opinions. It may
also incline district judge visitors to defer more readily to colleagues who have acquired such experience, and to rely less on
their own beliefs and instincts. By contrast, there are areas of federal law-criminal procedure or employment discrimination, for
example-in which a district judge visitor can help educate his
panel colleagues on the intricacies associated with conducting a
trial or developing an evidentiary record. Performing this collegial function may in turn encourage the visiting judge to participate more fully as a panel member, which includes volunteering
more often for majority opinion assignments and reflecting his
own personal and professional experiences during the deliberative process.
On the other hand, it may be that district judges are generally more reserved when serving on appellate panels. Such adaptability could be attributable in part to their temporary status,
combined with the rational perception that their subsequent decisions as trial judges will continue to be reviewed by these same
appellate actors. Indeed, given that appellate review under the
NLRA does not require districtjudge visitors to pass judgment on
the work product of their trial court friends or colleagues, one
might even expect a more outspoken approach to the appellate
enterprise in those settings.
Whether district judge behavior in NLRA matters is representative or atypical cannot be determined without further empirical
study. It would be useful to examine designated district judge
performance in other fields of substantive law, including fields in
which appellate panels primarily review judgments of trial courts
rather than federal agencies. Another area that warrants additional inquiry involves possible differences between the behavior
of active and senior district judge visitors. Of the 105 district
judges in our data set, slightly over one-third were on senior status at the time they participated in appellate decisionmaking.
When we reran our equations to take account of this senior status, our results were inconclusive. With regard to opinionwriting, it was seniors, not actives, who were significantly less
likely than their appellate colleagues to issue signed majority
opinions, but it was actives, not seniors, who were significantly
less likely to dissent. In terms of the association with background

HeinOnline -- 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 600 2001

Brudney & Ditslear

601

factors, seniors and actives behaved identically: Both were significandy less likely than regular appellate judges to reflect their personal or professional backgrounds when voting for or against the
union's legal position. Examination by judicial behavior scholars
of other appellate decisions may shed more light on the impact
of visiting judges with senior status.
Finally, it is noteworthy that district judge visitors participated
in 27% of NLRA-related appellate court decisions during our
seven-year period, substantially above their 17% participation
rate for all cases as discussed above. 6 6 The unusually high level of
district judge inclusion for a category of cases that involves review
of agency decisions may in part be indirectly attributable to the
policy followed by many circuits of not assigning districtjudges to
review cases decided by their trial court colleagues. 67 The possibility of variations in district judge participation rates based on
such neutrally applied circuit court assignment practices is another area that warrants further exploration.
66 See Table 1. Of the 1,140 cases we examined in which appellate court panels
reviewed unfair labor practice adjudications between October 1986 and November 1993,
307 (26.9%) included a districtjudge visitor sitting by designation. For three circuits-the
4th, 8th, and 10th-more than half of all NLRA cases had district judges sitting by designation. Moreover, for seven circuits the district judge participation rate on NLRA cases
was at least twice as high as for cases in general, and for only one circuit was it lower. The
following circuit-by-circuit comparison is based on Table 1 figures plus compilations from
the database, on file with authors.
Circuit
D.C.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

Overall DJ%
3.8%
13.8%
19.9%
20.0%
22.6%
4.4%
33.0%
13.1%
16.3%
13.2%
31.2%
11.8%

NLRA Cases DJ%
1.5%
36.8%
27.5%
27.0%
56.3%
8.2%
32.8%
26.7%
50.8%
19.8%
53.8%
20.4%

(2/131)
(7/19)
(28/102)
(30/111)
(40/71)
(4/49)
(62/189)
(35/131)
(32/63)
(36/182)
(21/39)
(10/49)

67 See, e.g., interview notes, n.12 for Circuit Executive from the 7th Circuit. (When
asked if he could think of a reason why district judge visitors had sat on NLRA cases in
disproportionate numbers, he suggested that because cases from the Chicago district
made up a substantial portion of the appellate docket in the years 1986-93 [and still do
today], the practice of not having district judges review cases from their own district
meant that district judge invitees from Chicago were somewhat limited in the cases they
could review; NLRA cases constituted one eligible category of cases). Circuit Executives in
the 3rd and 10th Circuits also recognized that districtjudges who were "conflicted out" of
reviewing cases from their own district might- be assigned to review agency decisions in
disproportionate numbers for some panel sittings. Other Circuit Executives, when asked
if they could account for the higher levels of participation in NLRA cases by district judge
visitors in their circuit, either had no ready explanation or attributed it to coincidence or
chance. See interview notes, n.12. In many circuits, the total number of NLRA cases reviewed over a seven-year period is low enough to lend support to this "coincidence or
chance" response.
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Meanwhile, some appellate courts may decide to follow the
D.C. Circuit's example and discontinue the use of designated districtjudges. Many others, however, will continue to rely on these
visitors to help manage their caseloads. Assuming that district
judges are included based on neutral selection criteria, 68 the
high level of district judge participation indicates that these visitors may play a disproportionate role in shaping appellate court
decisions-and consequent policy directions-in the labor law
area. The results of our study suggest that there is a need to consider more clearly the possible tradeoffs between efficient judicial administration and a less robust decisionmaking process.
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